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Which Effective Tax Rate?
ABSTRACT
Inestimating the effects of capital income taxation, different
studies measure different effective tax rates. Thispaper categorizes
effective tax rate estimates into six basic types, and discusses the
usefulness of each. For marginal effective tax rates, some studies esti-
mate the additional taxes associated with a marginal increase in the
inflation and interest rates, while others estimate the additionaltaxes
associated with a marginal increase in investment. Because thereare
six basic types of rates, because of the differentprocedures that can
be used to estimate each type, and because of differentassumptions about







Economists have long been concerned with the incentive effects of
capital income taxation. Because taxes are imposed on different kinds of
income at different rates by different revenue authorities at the federal,
state, and local levels, the combined effects are unlikely to correspond in
a meaningful way to any single coherent plan for the maximization of social
welfare. Moreover, because of the complexities involving inflation, corporate
financial policy, separate personal and corporate tax systems, investment
tax credits, depreciation allowances, pension savings, insurance companies,
and the effects of uncertainty, an overall evaluation of capital income
taxation is necessarily a difficult and ambiguous exercise.
The first type of task faced by studies of capital taxation is to measure
the effective size of the tax wedge between the pre—tax return to investment
and the post—tax return to the saver. This wedge, or effective tax rate, may
differ according to the asset, industry, or other characteristics of the
activity being taxed. A second kind of task is to use these different effec—
tive tax rates to measure efficiency losses associated with particular types
of capital misallocation. Following Arnold Harberger (1966), different studies
have measured efficiency effects of favoring noncorporate capital over corporate
capitalj' equipment over structures,- owner—occupied housing over rental
housing,--" present consumption over future consumption,-" and even debt—finance
over equity—finance)-" A couple of studies have looked at misallocations in
terms of who saves and who bears
Thepurpose of this paper is to discuss the first type of task as it
relates to the second. In particular,there has been a wide variety of—2—
methodologies as well as a wide variety of results in the estimation of
effective tax rates for the U.S. Different effective tax rate methodologies
may be designed and suited for different purposes. Often, however, when we
undertake only the first of the two tasks outlined above, we do not clearly
specify the purposes for which our effective tax rate estimates are best
suited. We refer to our estimates of "the effective tax rate," without
further defining the term. Other researchers are left to interpret these
effective tax rates and to err in their use.
The next section of this paper looks at this wide variety of effective
tax rates and categorizes them into six basic types. In particular, we
distinguish between "average" effective tax rates and "marginal" effective
tax rates. These rates may include only "corporate" taxes (i.e. average
effective corporate tax rate, marginal effective corporate tax rate) or may
include the "total" of corporate, personal, and property taxes. Such distinc-
tions are important because of the prominence that different estimates have had
in U.S. policy discussions and in publications such as the Economic Report of
the President.
Section 3 considers why, in practice, average effective tax rate esti-
mates are so different from marginal effective tax rate estimates. We suggest
eleven separate reasons for such differences in the U.S., but most of these
reasons apply to other countries as well.
The situation is further complicated by the existence of different pro-
cedures to estimate each basic type of effective tax rate. Section 4 discusses
some of these choices and the appropriate use of each type of rate. In
particular, the marginal effective tax rate depends fundamentally on the
nature of the margin. One can calculate the additional tax associated with
a marginal increase in the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate,
or the amount of investment. A marginal increase to investment in different—3—
assets might be undertaken in proportion to existing capital stock, or in
proportion to gross investment, net investment, or other annual flows.
Effective tax rates are used to measure the impact of taxes on incentives,
but the proper use of such rates requires a careful answer to the question:
incentives to do what? In particular, we argue that the extra tax associated
with a particular marginal investment is a useful measure for the incentive
to make that investment. The extra tax associated with an increase in the
nominal interest rate is a useful measure for some of the redistributive
effects of taxation, but it has no significance for the actions of investors.
These arguments are applied to particular cases in Section 5, where we
look at the different assumptions and procedures used in two studies of U.S.
effective tax rates. In order to determine the importance of each difference,
we start with the data and procedures of one study and make one change at a
time until we have only the data and procedures of the other study. Section
6 provides concluding remarks.
2. A Suggested Taxonomy
Table 1 distinguishes six types of effective tax rate. Each of these
types has been measured and used by different studies, and each has been
labelled as "the effective tax rate." The first two of these types are
"average" effective tax rates, generally defined by actual taxes paid as a
proportion of capital income. The basic approach in this case is to look at
the "cash flow," in one year, from users of capital to owners of capital andto
government. These actual taxes might refer to just "corporate" taxes paid, or
to the "total" of corporate, personal, and property taxes.
These average effective tax rates are relatively easy to calculate, and
they are useful for measuring incomes of capital owners, revenues of government,Table 1
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(1982)—4—
and the size of the public sector. These ratios capture, for existing
capital, the reduction in taxes associated with accelerated depreciation
and the investment tax credit. They also capture the addition to taxes
associated with inflation through historical cost depreciation, FIFO
inventory accounting, the taxation of nominal capital gains, and fixed
nominal income tax brackets. Since all investments are affected by these
phenomena, the tax on previous investment might be a reasonable approxima-
tion of the expected tax on a marginal investment. The next section finds
eleven reasons why it might not be a reasonable approximation, however. The
allocation of capital is determined by the incentive of each industry to
employ the marginal unit of capital. Nevertheless, average effective tax
rates have been used in many studies to measure distortions in capital
allocation [see, for example, Harberger (1966), Shoven (1976), Fullerton,
Shoven and Whalley (FSW, 1978, 1983), and Slemrod (1983)].
The measurement of average effective tax rates is not unambiguous.
Fiekowsky (1977), for example, points out that a.) U.S. tax as a proportion
of corporate income could omit foreign taxes already paid, b.) profits mea-
sured for tax purposes invariably differ from profits measured for financial
reporting, c.) a correct measure of profits requires actual depreciation,
a cost which is difficult to establish by market transactions or by arbitrary
schedule, and d.) actual taxes in any year may not be related to profits
in that year, due to carryforwards of previous credits or losses, and carry—
backs of current credits or losses. These problems have encouraged researchers
to use measures of economic depreciation such as those in Coen (1980), and
to take the average over several years for taxes in the numerator and for
profits in the denominator [see Rosenberg (1969) and FSW (1978, 1983)].
There are additional problems measuring the average effective total tax
rate. Property tax data often are not sufficiently disaggregated by asset or—5—
industry. Moreover, it is impossible to specify separately the personal
taxes that are paid on capital income, because of the graduatedrate structure.
Most studies assume that labor income is received "first", in thateach type
of capital income is multiplied by the appropriatemarginal rate to get the
tax paid on it. Thus many studies mix aspects ofaverage and marginal effec-
tive tax rates. Next, the denominatorrequires information on real corporate
profits, interest paid, rents paid, and any real capital gains.Finally,
for an effective tax rate in the noncorporatesector, entrepreneurial income
must be divided into labor and capital components. WhenHarberger and FSW
attribute a normal wage to National Accounts' estimates ofproprietors' hours
worked in each industry, the estimated laborcomponent often comes to more than
the proprietors' total observed income.
More recent studies have employed a cost of capitalapproach based on
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) to estimate a marginal effectivetax rate. In
this approach, the net cost of a hypothetical investmentproject is defined
as the purchase price minus the present value of tax savings fromdepreciation
allowances and investment tax credit. Compare this netcost to the present
value of after—tax returns on the asset. If the twowere not equal, profit—
seeking investors would drive up the cost of the asset or drive down the
return until they become equal. Given an interest rate for theopportunity
cost of funds, this equilibrium equality can be used to-estimate thepre—tax
real rate of return that the asset would earn, net ofdepreciation. The
marginal effective corporate tax wedge is defined as this pre—tax return
minus the corporation's real post—tax return. Divisionby the pre-tax return
provides a tax—inclusive rate, or division by the post—tax return providesa
tax—exclusive rate.
This model assumes perfect information, competition, and zeroexcess
profits.It usually abstracts from all considerations of risk, and it
usually assumes that the firm has sufficient taxable profits to use all
credits and deductions at the earliest opportunity. These choices are not—6—
automatic, however, and studies differ in these respects.-21
Marginal effective tax rate measures can account forexpected inflation,
statutory tax rates, credit rates, and depreciation allowances, andthey can
be designed to include corporate, personal, andproperty taxes in the analysis.
AS a practical matter, however, the algebraicexpressions cannot be designed
to account for all complexities of theway in which actual taxes are affected
by myriad provisions such as graduated rate schedules, locationalchoices,
depletion allowances, export subsidies and the like. (Suchcomplexities are
included in the average effective tax ratemeasure, but they might not affect
taxes on the marginal investment.)
Data requirements for each investment include itsrate of investment
tax credit, depreciation lifetime and allowances,actual depreciation rate,
the statutory tax rate, the expected inflationrate, and the opportunity cost
of funds (the interest rate used fordiscounting). Credits and allowances
can be obtained from the tax law and are explained inany of the papers
listed under number 3 of Table 1. Economicdepreciation rates are often
obtained from Hulten and Wykoff (1981a). Thiscareful study finds that
economic depreciation can be approximated byexponential rates for 32 dif-
ferent assets. It satisfies our immediate dataproblem but does not, of course,
"solve" the ultimate problem ofmeasuring depreciation.
For the statutory tax rate, onlyvery small firms never reach the top
corporate bracket. The typical marginal investment is thus taxedat the
top federal rate of 46 percent, and at anaverage state rate. King and
Fullerton (1983) average over fifty states toget a statutory rate of 6.55
percent. Accounting for deductibility of state taxes at the federallevel,
the statutory rate is thus [.46 + .0655(1 —.46)J,or 49.5 percent.
Finally, the inflation rate and interest rate areusually chosen by
assumption.!" Bradford andFullerton (1981) point out three major problems—7—
in these choices. First, the present value of delayed depreciation allowances
depends in a nonlinear fashion on the net interest rate used for discounting.
Since the required pre—tax return depends on this present value, the marginal
effective tax rate can be very sensitive to the assumed interest rate. That
paper provides an example where the effective tax rate varies between 40 and
100 percent for real net returns between zero and 6 percent.
Secondly, credits and accelerated deductions might imply negative
effective taxes. As the subsidy increases in the numerator of the effective
tax rate formula, the required pre—tax return approaches zero in the denominator.
The subsidy can thus be an arbitrarily high fraction of the pre—tax return.
Moreover, if the subsidy is large enough that the required pre—tax return turns
negative, the negative tax in the numerator is divided by a negative pre—tax
return. The resulting positive number is difficult to interpret at best.
This problem can be solved by using only the numerator or "effective tax
wedge," interpreted as the percentage of asset value paid in tax each year.
Thirdly, a comparison of different inflation rates requires an assumption
about how inflation affects nominal interest. Two candidates are "Strict
Fisher's Law," under which inflation adds point—for—point to the nominal
interest rate, and "Modified Fisher's Law" under which inflation adds more
than point—for—point. Empirical studies conflict on which law actually
holds,-' but they may not be relevant. To measure the effects of inflation
alone, we may wish to make the ceteris paribus assumption that all else
is held equal. A fixed real after—tax return logically implies Modified
10/ Fisher s Law.—
Very few studies have extended this marginal effective taxrate method-
ology to include personal taxes. In fact, it may not be necessaryto do so,
depending on the purpose of the study. As discussed inlater sections, if
one is interested in the allocation of capital among competing uses,one can
assume that the firm makes decisions based on theinterest rate it must pay—8
in a general bond market. If the market is large and risk isignored, this
opportunity cost does not depend on the particular characteristics of those
who buy the bonds. In other words, the cost ofcapital does not depend on
personal taxes. With a noncorporate sector, the cost of capitalmight
depend on property taxes and the entrepreneur's personal taxrate, however,
and some studies have included these costs.
Many other phenomena do depend on personal taxes, including the alloca-
tion of risk taking among households, the allocation ofsavings among house-
holds, and the allocation of one household's savingsamong vehicles. Moreover,
if one is interested in the effect of taxeson the intertemporal allocation of
resources, one must include all taxes on income from investments. King and
Fullerton (1983) have measured marginal effective total taxrates for three
different assets, three different industries, three differentsources of
finance, and three ownership categories.
3. Average vs. Marginal Rates
The distinction between average effective tax rates andmarginal effective
tax rates would be inconsequential if tax systems were proportionalor if the
two measures turned out to have similar results. Unfortunately this isnot
the case.Fullerton and Henderson (1983) measureaverage effective corporate
tax rates for each of 18 U.s. industries andmarginal effective corporate tax
rates for the same 18 industries, but there is almostno resemblance between
the two sets of rates. Both sets of effective tax rateswere then recalculated
using different years, different data sources, different assumptions about
expected inflation, and different expected returns. Each vector of 18average
effective tax rates was paired with each vector of marginal effective taxrates.
The correlation coefficients varied around zero but never exceeded 0.3.—9—
There are eleven possible explanations for the differences. The
relative importance of each explanation is likely to differ according to the
asset, industry, or other breakdown used for measuring different effective
tax rates. Also, most of these differences apply to effective total tax
rates as well as to effective corporate tax rates.
1. The corporate tax system has four brackets of $25,000 where income
is taxed at low rates; only income above $100,000 is taxed at the 46 percent
top marginal rate. For this reason, the effective tax rate on the marginal
investment is likely to be higher than the effective tax rate on the average
investment.
2. The marginal effective tax rate gives the net percentage of the
expected return that is expected to be paid in tax. Any unexpected income
from the investment, because it does not affect investment tax credits or
depreciation allowances, will be taxed at the corporation's statutory rate.
If the marginal effective corporate tax rate is less than the statutory tax
rate, and if there exist unusal profits (losses) due to business cycles or
structural changes in demand, then the actual taxes paid turn out to be
greater than (less than) the expected taxes.
3. If profits are so low that not all deductions and credits can be
used, we have an additional reason for the two measures of effective tax rates
to differ. This time, for unprofitable firms, the marginal effective tax
rate is altered, It becomes very important to specify the nature of the
margin under consideration, because marginal investments might be undertaken
by profitable or unprofitable firms in an industry. Average effective tax
rates are also affected by the number of unprofitable firms that are not
paying taxes, and even in a profitable year they are affected by the carry-
over of losses from previous years.— 10—
4.Even if all firms are profitable, such thatall credits and deduc-
tions can be used, many firms do not minimize their taxes in this way. Some
firms use depreciation lifetimes that are longer than the minimum allowed
by law, some firms pay additional taxes by using FIFO rather than LIFO
inventory accounting, and some firms increase the total tax on capital income
by simultaneously paying dividends and issuing new shares. Finns also differ
in other aspects such as the charitable deductions that they take. These
choices affect actual taxes paid by firms without necessarily affecting the
distorting tax wedge that must be paid on the expected income from a marginal
investment.
5. Any pure profits, though not unexpected, are taxed at the statutory
rate without affecting credits or deductions. These pure profits may be
attributed to the ownership of an "asset" such as an idea, a valuable location,
or other source of monopoly power. If the statutory rate exceeds the marginal
effective rate (on tangible investments), then these pure profits tend to push
the average effective tax rate above the marginal effective tax rate.
6. Changes in tax law affect deductions or credits for new investments
without changing the deductions remaining on previous investments. The
Accelerated Cost Recovery System implies reduced marginal effective tax
rates on new investments, while higher effective taxes are still being paid
on investments made under the Asset Depreciation Range system or even before.
7. Even without changes in tax law, the growth rate for capital affects
actual taxes when only new investment qualifies for credits or when deprecia-
tion allowances are accelerated. An increase in the average age of existing
capital, through slower growth, tends to increase the average effective tax
rate because less capital is getting credits and deductions. A decrease in
the average age, through faster growth, tends to decrease the average effective11 —
taxrate. Neither of these changes in the growth rate affects the expected
tax on a single hypothetical marginal investment.
8. The marginal effective tax rate depends on expected inflation,
while the average effective tax rate depends on actual or past inflation.
The two tax rates can differ anytime that actual and expected inflation
rates differ. A temporary and unanticipated increase in the rate of infla-
tion, for example, reduces the real value of depreciation allowances on past
investments and thus increases the real taxes paid on them. If it is not
expected to continue, however, it does not affect the marginal effective
tax rate (and therefore has nothing to do with investment incentives).
9. Because interest is deductible at the corporate level, the effective
tax on a project financed by debt can be less than that on a project fin-
anced by equity. If the marginal investment were financed by a ratio of
debt to equity that is anything other than the firm's average ratio of debt
to equity, then the marginal effective tax rate could again differ from the
average effective tax rate. More on this later.
10. Equity may be "trapped" in the corporation, as argued by King
(1977), Auerbach (1979), and Bradford (1981). If the market values of
shares already reflect the fact that taxes must be paid when profits are
distributed, then dividend taxes do not distort any behavior. These lump—
sum taxes could raise the average effective total tax rate without affecting
marginal incentives.
11. Finally, the analysis could be expanded to includeconsideration
of risk and the taxation of the risk premium. If losseson the marginal
investment can be used to offset profits on other investments, then thetax
can be viewed as risk sharing by the government. The firm givesup a frac-
tion of the return, but gives up the same fraction of the risk. Taxeson
the risk—free part of the investment's return can lower themarginal incentives— 12—
toinvest, but taxes on the risk premium exactly reflect the value of the
risk forgone. Because the latter tax payments reflect no marginal investment
disincentives, the average effective tax rate can exceed the marginal effec-
tive tax rate for this reason as well [see Fullerton and Gordon (1983)1.
In light of all these reasons for the two effective tax rate measures
to differ, it may be surprising that the correlation coefficientwas ever
as high as 0.3! Yet the differences are very important for policy purposes.
Some of these phenomena affect actual taxes, income flows, and government
revenues, while others affect marginal behavior, new investment, growth,
and factor allocations.
Figure 1, obtained from Hulten and O'Neill (1982), very neatly summarizes
the overall effect of these differences from 1952 to 1980. The dotted line
shows the top bracket statutory corporate tax rate, the dashed line shows their
average effective corporate tax rate, and the solid line shows theirmarginal
effective corporate tax rate. This marginal rate averages over equipment
and structures, a procedure to which we will return in the next section.
For now, however, we merely note that the eleven reasons discussedin this sec-
tion are enough to create substantial deviations between average and marginal
effective tax rates over time. The lines cross frequently, indicating no
general presumption about which rate is higher.
4. Uses for Effective Tax Rates
Previous sections argue that average effective tax rates are appropriate
for measuring cash flows, while marginal effective tax rates are designed to
capture incentives to use new capital. It is difficult for marginal rates to
capture many legal complexities, however, so average rates have often been
used as estimates of the taxes to be paid on marginal investments.SOURCE: US. Department ol Commerce,Bureauof Economic Analysis, The National ('prone.' asic) Proc/tn,Atcou,r,rof the United Siorec,
1929—1976. Siulissical Tables lWashington. D.C.: GPO, 1981). table 1.13; and C. R. Hulten.J. W. Robertson.S.M Davies. unpublished. Tax rates refertothe nonresidential, monlinancial segment of the corporatesector.
Figure 1
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Thechoice between effective corporate tax rates and effective total
tax rates is much clearer. Assuming that all corporations operate in the
same risk—free bond market, they all face the same opportunity cost of
funds. The personal characteristics of the investors are unimportant, and
differing effective corporate tax rates can be used to measure the efficiency
costs associated with resource misallocations. Average effective corporate
tax rates can be measured for different industries and used to study inter—
industry distortions. Alternatively, marginal effective corporate tax rates
can be measured for different assets and used to study inter—asset distortions
[see Gravelle (1982)]. In fact, the required pre—tax returns can be used
directly to measure inter—asset distortions. There is no need to subtract
the expected real after—tax return and calculate an effective taxrate)11'
Measuring the cost of inter—asset distortions also requires information
on how firms substitute among types of equipment, among structures, or among
those and other assets. In the absence of elasticity estimates, many have
assumed that firms can substitute among all assets with a unitary elasticity
in a Cobb—Douglas production function. This is a powerful assumption since,
for example, the extreme alternative of fixed coefficient technology would
imply no misallocations among assets due to differential taxation.Even
the unitary elasticities are ambiguous. On the one hand, firms may use
one percent more of the asset in response to a one percent fallin its
rental price (cost of capital gross of depreciation). On the other hand,
firms may use one percent more of the asset in response to a one percent
fall in its required return (net of depreciation). With non—zero and differ-
ing depreciation rates, the two assumptions about investmentbehavior are
quite different. A given tax cut can imply that the requiredrate of return
falls more for equipment than for structures while the gross rental price
falls more for structures than forequipment)'— 14—
Sinceactual income and taxes are not attributed to individual assets,
average effective tax rates are not available on that breakdown. Similarly,
marginal effective tax rates are not immediately available on an industry
breakdown. With information on the use of each asset by each industry, how-
ever, marginal effective tax rates for different assets can be converted into
rates for different industries. Each industry's tax rate is then a weighted
average of the different assets' tax rates. Though asset usages clearly
differ by industry, the weighted—average industry tax rates exhibit far less
variation than the asset tax rates. In any case, these rates have been used
to study inter—industry distortions [see Fullerton and Henderson (1983)1.
More problems arise when the marginal effective corporate tax rates for
different assets are averaged for the whole economy. First, such averages
typically involve equipment and structures, ignoring taxes on the income from
investments in land, inventories, and intangible assets such as goodwill
through advertising or knowledge through R&D. Second, such averages no longer
provide information on inter—asset or inter—industry distortions. Third, they omit
personal taxes and property taxes and thus provide no information on intertemporal
distortions. Figure 1, for example, shows a falling marginal effective corporate
tax rate from 1970 —1980, averaged over equipment and structures. We cannot
conclude that there has been a reduction in overall tax disincentives, because
such a rate provides no information on changes in personal taxes, changes in
state and local property taxes, or changes in corporate taxes on assets
other than equipment and structures. In fact, it is difficult to think of a
useful question for which this averaged marginal effective corporate tax rate
provides an appropriate answer.
Intertemporal distortions require an estimate of the marginal effective
total tax rate. (Average effective total tax rates have been used for this— 15—
purpose,but only as a way to estimate the likely total tax on a marginal
investment.) Generally, such rates pose a number of tricky problems.
First, it is not clear that the property tax represents an investment
disincentive. The Tiebout Hypothesis suggests that local jurisdictions
compete for residents and for firms by offering a package of local public
services. With sufficient mobility among a sufficient number of jurisdic—
would be able to charge more for these services than
the firm.---' Property taxes are thus tied directly to
represent only voluntary payments for intermediate input
if this mechanism does not operate, however, property tax
entrants suggest that the marginal effective tax rate
the average effective tax rate.
effective total tax rate includes the entire wedge between
and the post—tax return of the ultimate owner who provides
the finance. If we are interested in U.S. savings incentives, however, we
might not want to include any inferences about the behavior of foreign
investors or government. The rate might be designed to measure all taxes
on the typical U.S. investment, or all taxes on the typical U.S. investor.
These are not the same, and again the proper definition of the effective
tax rate depends on the purpose to which it will be put.
Thirdly, the difference between the pre—tax return and the post—tax
return does not include all of the disincentives associated with taxation.
For tax—exempt bonds, since no taxes are actually paid, the pre—tax return
equals the post—tax return and the "effective tax rate" is zero. Yet
this tax—free return is less than it would have been in the absence of
taxes on taxable bonds. An implicit tax is missed by the usual measure of
effective tax rate [see Galper and Toder (1982) and page 158 of U.S. Treasury
(1977)].
tions, no one town




could be less than
Secondly, the
the pre—tax return-16-
Fourthly, it is difficult to aggregate the effective total tax rates
on different kinds of investment. Suppose, for example, that the corporation
finances one marginal investment project by selling a bond to an individual
retirement account (IRA). The corporation receives an investment tax credit
and accelerated depreciation allowances. The entire return to the asset
is then deducted by the firm, since it is paid out in interest. Ultimately,
the individual is not taxed on his Interest receipts. The result is a
substantially negative total tax rate. For a different investment, if it
is financed by selling new shares directly to the household, and if the
return is paid out in taxable dividends, the total tax is substantially
positive. King and Fullerton (1983) aggregate these different investments
together, weighting by the airunts of actual capital that are financed in
each way. There is no assurance, however, that marginal investments would
be financed in the same way as past investments. For effective corporate
tax rates, as mentioned above, many studies assume that firms minimize taxes
by using LIFO inventory accounting, minimum lifetimes, and the earliest
possible depreciation deductions. The logical extention of this assumption
to total tax rates .iould imply that firms always use debt as the cheapest
source of finance and that individuals always save through tax—free vehicles.
The resulting negative effective total tax rate can always apply to the
marginal investment, as long as there are any taxable profits, including
a.) the normal return to old investments upon which taxes were deferred,
b.) normal returns to taxed investments like land and inventories, c.) unex-
pected returns to some new investments, d.) any pure profits, or e.) safe
harbor leasing.
In using this kind of analysis, we are forced to make difficult judgments.
As mentioned above, even the simple cost of capital formula implies a judgment
that opportunities for profits are exhausted. We might simultaneously decide,— 17—
forsome reason, that opportunities for investments in tax—free accounts
are not exhausted. There are a number of equilibria that might be consistent
with investor arbitrage, and we must choose among them. This is particularly
difficult in a model with perfect certainty. On the one hand, when the
firm undertakes a marginal investment, it always has the option of reducing
its debt instead. In equilibrium, no matter how the investment is financed,
its net of tax return should be equal to that of retiring a unit of debt.
Thus the net of tax interest rate represents the opportunity cost of funds
and is always used for discounting the investment's return.
Arbitrage at the firm level implies that the firm's cost of funds is
independent of the source of finance. With differences in personal taxes
on interest, dividends, and capital gains, however, the individual's net
of tax return is not independent of the source of finance. An alternative
assumption is that arbitrage at the individual level insures equality in
the net returns to an individual. In this case, since dividends are highly
taxed at the personal level, new equity represents an expensive source of
finance. Any equity financed investment must provide a high enough pre—tax
return that the dividend recipient can pay these higher taxes and still earn
the same net return that he could have earned in the bond market. In this
case, the cost of funds to the firm is not independent of the source of
finance.
A reconciliation can be accomplished in either of two ways. First, con-
straints might prevent the kind of. arbitrage discussed at either level. Firms
may face limits on their borrowing and/or requirements on their dividends.
Individuals may face limits on their borrowing and/or ceilings on their tax—
free accounts. Financial markets may be completely specialized such that only
low—brackQt investors hold bonds and only high—bracket investors hold equity.
No single investor wtuld then have to earn the same net return on bonds— 18—
ason equity. Secondly, the simultaneous holding of debt and equity with
different net returns can be reconciled through the introduction of risk
into the analysis. Either type of reconciliation, however, will affect the
allocative significance of taxes.If all individuals are at their IRA
ceilings, then these tax—free vehicles are irrelevant for the marginal
investment. If investors self—select debt or equity, as in Miller (1977)
then the tax on an additional unit of either might be represented by the
tax bracket which divides the two. Lastly, if additional debt increases the
risk of bankruptcy, the marginal interest rate may be higher than the rate
previously paid.
5. A Specific Comparison
Feldstein and Summers (1979) find that the effective total tax on U.S.
capital income is about 66 percent. King and Fullerton (1983), under one
set of assumptions, find it to be 37 percent. Is it possible to reconcile
these divergent estimates? The former study looks at the annual cash flow of
corporate taxes and capital income. For this reason it must be classified
in the above taxonomy as an average effective total tax rate, even though it
includes personal taxes on interest and dividends at the weighted average
personal marginal rates. The latter study considers new investment and
measures a marginal effective total tax rate. As a consequence, any or
all of eleven reasons in Section 3 may contribute to the divergence in
results. A reconciliation of the two numbers mentioned above is virtually
impossible.
This section undertakes the less ambitious task of reconciling just
part of the difference between these two studies. In particular, Feldstein
and Summers (hereafter FS) find that the appropriate corporate rate for
interest deductions is 40.4 percent and that the appropriate personal rate— 19—
fortaxes on interest income is 42.0 percent. As a result, when inflation
increases nominal interest deductions and nominal interest receipts, the
effective tax rate goes up. Inflation also increases effective taxes through
historical cost depreciation, FIFO inventory accounting, and the taxation of
-
insurancecompanies. In contrast, King and Fullerton (hereafter 1(F)
find that the appropriate corporate rate for interest deductions is 49.5
percent and that the appropriate personal rate for taxes on interest income
is 23.6 percent. In this case, one effect of inflation is to increase the
value of nominal interest deductions by more than it increases taxes on
interest recipients. This effect of inflation is to reduce the effective
total tax rate.
At initial levels of inflation, the effect of historical cost deprecia-
tion is strong enough that inflation raises effective tax rates. The real
value of depreciation allowances can only be reduced so far, however, so
further inflation has less and less impact through depreciation. Since
additional inflation continues to augment the nominal interest rate, with
the value of increased deductions exceeding the increased tax on receipts,
the effective total tax rate eventually starts to fall. King and Fullerton
estimate an effective tax rate curve with a peak at about a 15 percent
inflation rate in the U.S.
The 1979 FS study includes years through 1977, while the1983 KF book
is able to include rates for the 1981 and 1982 tax acts aswell as for the old
law. For present purposes, we use KF rates from the old lawfor comparability
to the FS study. Also, while FS try only to includefederal level taxes,
KF include both federal and state level taxes. Surprisingly,these two
differences make very little impact. The major difference betweenthe two
studies involves their assumptions about what margin isrelevant.— 20—
Thisdifference can be explained by looking at capital income as iK,
the product of a nominal rate of return i and a capital stock K. This capital
income can increase at the margin either because of a higher rate of return
or because of an addition to the capital stock. FS are interested in the
taxes associated with an increase in the inflation rate and thus an increase
in the nominal return i. KF are interested in the taxes associated with an
increase in capital stock K. The difference is particularly important for
marginal effective tax rates because taxes on additional nominal income are
not offset by investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation allowances.
The appropriate treatments of banks and insurance companies also depend
heavily on this difference, as we shall see.
To obtain the appropriate rate for corporate interest deductions, PS
start by looking at personal taxes on equity income. Dividend receipts of
households, pension funds, banks, and insurance companies are taxed at a
weighted—average rate of 28.7 precent. Capital gains are taxed at an
effective accrued rate of 4.7 percent. With a 46 percent average payout
ratio, the average personal rate for marginal equity income is 15.7 percent.
Next, FS suppose that inflation raises nominal interest payments by one
dollar with no change in real income. This change in itself would save
the shareholders 48 cents of corporation tax(under1977 law), but the
48 cents of additional equity income is taxed at the 15.7 percent personal
rate. The net saving to shareholders is .48(l—.157), which equals 40.4
percent. An increase in i reduces shareholders' taxes by 40.4 percent, so this
rate is used for interest deductions.
When KF calculate the rate for interest deductions, they consider an
additional unit of debt—financed capital. The income from the investment is
used to make interest payments, with no change in shareholders' income. The— 21—
interestpayments are deducted at the corporation's 46 percent federal rate
(under 1980 law) and at an average state rate of 6.55 percent. As mentioned
in Section 2, KF find that the total federal and state statutory corporate
tax rate is 49.5 percent, accounting for federal deductibility of state
taxes. Thus, in summary, the difference between the margins of IFS and KF
explains most of the difference between the rates they use for corporate
interest deductions.
For taxes on interest receipts, Table 2 outlines the calculations of
each study. FS employ the tax rates in the first column, weight by the pro-
portions found in the second column, and obtain a 42 percent average rate
for marginal interest income. KF employ the tax rates in the third column,
weight by the l980 proportions in the last column, and obtain a 23.6 percent
average rate for marginal interest income. Let us look at each difference
in turn.
Households. Both studies use estimates from the TAXSIM model of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. With tax returns from 25,000 households,
this model increases all interest receipts by one percent and calculates the
total additional tax as a proportion of the additional income. The resulting
25 percent federal rate is increased to 35percentby Feldstein and Summers,
because"corporate bonds are held by more affluent taxpayers than ordinary
bank account time deposits" (p. 454). Without evidence on the size of this
effect, KF decline to make this adjustment. They do include state taxes in
theTAXSIM model, however, and obtain a 32.5 percent rate. If the 35 percent
rate of PS were replaced by 32.5 percent, their average rate would only fall
from 42.0 to 41.8 percent.
Commerical Banks. If the bank's interest receipts increase, with no
new deposits, there is no reason for expenses to be affected. PS assume that














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cent and that the remaining 52 percent is taxed again at the average personal
rate on equity, 15.7 percent. The total rate is 54 percent)' This assumption
also requires that the banks earn monopoly profits that are not bid away by
increased expenses due to competition within the banking sector. If instead,
as in KF, the additional- income is associated with a new deposit used to make
a new investment, then much of the bank's income must be used to pay interest
on the new deposit and to cover expenses of servicing it. With competition
for new accounts, there is no excess profit. Some of the interest is taxed
at the depositor's marginal rate of 32.5 percent, and some is received by
the depositor in the form of tax—free services. In this approach, time
deposits are just a conduit through which corporations borrow from individuals
and pay interest to them. Demand deposits are another conduit for some cor-
porate financing, but individuals receive check—writing services in place of
pecuniary returns. Flow of Funds data reveal that demand deposits make up
23.5 percent of commercial bank liabilities, so KF use .325(l—.235) =.249
for the personal tax on corporate interest payments to commercial banks. If
just the commercial bank rate of .54 is replaced by .249, the overall tax in
the FS study falls from 42 to 31.2 percent. This difference, attributable
to the nature of the margin, is large because conmiercial bank holdings are
15 / large.—
Savings Institutions. For increased nominal interest income of mutual
savings banks, FS again start with the 48 percent corporate rate of the bank.
They assume that some of this nominal income is sheltered through holding
local mortgages and that some is passed through to depositors. They use a
24 percent rate, assuming half is sheltered. For an additional corporate
investment however, KF assume that the bank receives an additional deposit
and lends to the corporation. Except for a small interest differential, used
to cover costs, all of the corporate interest is passed on to the new depositor— 23—
andtaxed at his 32.5 percent personal rate. This KF assumption by
itself would raise the overall FS rate from 42.0 to 42.5 percent.
Finance Companies. FS use the unsheltered rate of 56 percent, reflecting
the 48 percent corporate rate plus the 15.7 percent personal rate on equity
income. Again, the additional interest income is monopoly profit to the
finance company which has no additional expenses. KY assume that the finance
company must borrow in order to make the new corporate loan and therefore
must pass all interest through to the household lender, taxed at 32.5 percent.
This change by itself would reduce the FS rate from 42 to 41.2 percent.
Pensions. Both studies use zero for the marginal tax rate on interest
income of pensions funds. Differences in the amount of savings through pensions
are discussed below.
Life Insurance. Both studies assume that the life insurance company is
taxed under "Phase I", where reserve requirements are determined for each
company in the "Nenge Formula", with several steps. First, the "adjusted
reserve rate" (arr) is found as the lesser of the company's current rate of
return (i) and the average rate of return for the last five years. Next, the
"average reserve interest rate" for all companies is derived from various
assumptions. This average rate assumption has remained close to .03 and has
not changed in response to inflation. Finally, the "adjusted life insurance
reserves" are calculated by assuming that each percentage point by which the
company's adjusted reserve rate (arr) exceeds the average interest rate (.03)
implies a ten percent reduction in required reserves. If all assets are held
only for reserves and the adjusted reserve rate (arr) equals the actual
interest rate (i), then Tax =.46iK[l0(i—.03)].When FS calculate the
extra tax for a change in i, they essentially differentiate this expression
with respect to i. Evaluated at i =.07,they get a rate of 57 percent)áJ— 24—
Ifthis derivative were evaluated at the 1980 interest rates of approximately
12 percent, the tax rate would be 96.6 percent. KF, of course, are not con-
cerned with an increase in i. From the above expression, the tax rate on
interest income ilC is equal to .46[l0(i—.03)]. Inflation still affects this
tax rate through i, but not as much as in the FS study. With i =.07,this
rate is 18.4 percent. KF employ an interest rate near 12 percent and obtain
a tax rate of 40.3 percent. When the overall FS rate is recalculated using
40.3 for life insurance, the 42 percent rate falls to 37.8 percent.'
Life Insurance Pensions. FS assume that all life insurance interest
income is taxed at the 57 percent combined corporate and personal rate. KF
recognize that the pension fund business of life insurance companies is not
taxable. These pension reserves make up an increasing fraction of total
life insurance reserves over time. In 1976, the year of the FS weights, pension
reserves were 35 percent of the total. If this proportion of life insurance
income were made nontaxable, keeping a 57 percent rate on the rest, then the
42 percent rate of FS falls to 36.9 percent. In 1980, the year of the KF
weights, pension reserves were 44 percent of the total.
Other Insurance. For interest income, insurance companies other
than life—insurance companies are basically taxed like other corporations.
FS take this to mean that an increase in the interest rate would be taxed
to shareholders at the combined corporate and personal tax rate of 56 percent
mentioned earlier. KF effectively assume that these insurance companies
make new investments out of their net earnings. Since personal tax would
have to be paid on those earnings in any case, the only additional tax is
the 46 percent corporate rate. This replacement reduces the overall FS rate
from 42 to 41.9 percent.
Weights. FS include zero tax rates for actual corporate interest pay-
ments to government and foreign investors. Instead of looking at actual
interest flows, KF consider a hypothetical marginal investment in a 13.5.— 25—
nonfinancialcorporation, financed by selling debt to domestic private savers.
They include state and local government pensions, at a zero tax rate, assuming
that these are funded and actuarily fair. Finally, the KF study uses a later
year. In order to show the effect of time on these relative holdings, the
last three columns of Table 2 show weights for 1960, 1970, and 1980. Bank
holdings of debt have increased dramatically, mostly at the expense of life
insurance business. Pension holdings of debt have decreased slightly (but
pension holdings of equity have increased very dramatically). If the 1976
weights from the PS study are replaced by the 1980 weights from the KP study,
with no change in the FS tax rates, the 42 percent average rises to a 42.9
percent average tax rate for marginal interest income. If 44 percent of
life insurance holdings in 1980 are attributable to pensions, as in the KF
study, the rate falls to 37.1 percent.
Some of the KF data tend to raise the PS tax rate, but most tend to
lower it. The major differences, found for commercial banks and life
insurance business, involve the nature of the margin. FS consider an
increase in the nominal interest rate i, while KF look at additional
capital K.
The two margins have very different implications for behavior.
To determine desired investment, individuals want to know the extra tax
associated with the marginal investment. Corporations receive investment
tax credits and accelerated depreciation at historical cost on this marginal
investment, and banks must pay the going rate of interest on the marginal
deposit. By contrast, the extra tax associated with a marginal changein
the interest rate does not involve any new credits or depreciation, or any
new deposits. It is not clear, however, that individuals cando anything
about the extra tax associated with a marginal change in the inflation rate
and the interest rate. Rather, if the inflation and interest rates change,- 26-
individualswant to know the new extra tax associated with the marginal
investment, including the ITC, accelerated depreciation at historical cost,
and taxes on the interest of the new deposit.
6. Conclusion
In estimating the effects of capital income taxation, different studies
measure different effective tax rates. This paper categorizes effective
tax rate estimates into six basic types, and discusses the usefulness
of each. For marginal effective tax rates, some studies estimate the addi-
tional taxes associated with a marginal increase in the inflation and interest
rates, while others estimate the additional taxes associated with a marginal
increase in investment. Because there are six basic types of rates, because
of the different procedures that can be used to estimate each type, and
because of different assumptions about the margin, care should be taken in
the application and use of effective tax rate estimates.Footnotes
1/See Harberger (1966), Shoven (1976), Hendershott and Hu (1980), and
Fullerton, Shoven, Whalley (1978).
2/ See Gravelle (1982), Hulten and Wykoff (l9slb), and Hendershott and
Hu (1980).
3/ See Rosen (1979), Slemrod (l982a), and King (1980).
4/See Boskin (1978), Feldstein (1978), Summers (198la), Fullerton,
Shoven, Whalley (1983).
5/See Gordon and Malkiel (1981) and Fullerton and Gordon (1983).
6/See Gordon and Malkiel (1981) and Slemrod (l982b).
7/Slemrod (1983) and Fullerton and Gordon (1983) consider risk in their
analyses. Fullerton and Henderson (1983) assume that the firm uses
statutory investment tax credits, LIFO inventory accounting, minimum
asset lifetimes, and most accelerated depreciation method available.
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) employ lower credits and longer lives,
based on actual practices of firms.
8/Some studies have used the actual inflation rate and actual return in
each year to estimate marginal effective corporate tax rates for each
year. This procedure is essentially wrong, in that the expected future
inflation rate and interest rate are the important variables affecting
the decision to undertake a new Investment. The only implicit assumption
under which this procedure makes sense is that investors are very myopic
and always expect the current inflation and interest rates to hold in
all future periods. While most studies choose these input parameters
by assumption, more thorough procedures would make explict assumptions
about expectations based on past values and then, for each year's invest-
ment, generate expected future inflation and interest rates.
9/Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980) find a constant real after—tax return —
tocorporations. Summers (198lb) finds that inflation adds at most
point—for—point to interest rates, so the real after—tax interest
rate must be falling as inflation rises. These results can be
compatible if returns to debt and equity differ systemmatically with
the inflation rate, but they are not compatible if corporations
arbitrage between bonds and real capital as discussed below.
10/ A fixed real after—tax return for a corporation taxed at rate u
implies that nominal interest increases by the inflation rate
over (1—u). If personal tax rate differ, we could assume a constant
real return after the average tax rate m. Or, if the relevant
investor is tax—exempt, a constant real return implies Strict Fisher's
Law.
11/ Assets with different tax rules have different required pre—tax returns,
but they all have the same cost of funds. Because the firm could retire
a unit of debt instead, any marginal investment faces an opportunity cost
given by the net of tax interesrrate. As a result, the different pre-
tax returns and ;esulting costs of distortions do not depend on whether
debt or equity finance is actually used. While the pre—tax returns are
correct for any type of finance, subtraction of the post—corporate—tax
return provides a marginal effective corporate tax rate for only equity
finance. The assumption about arbitrage i.s discussed more below.—F2-
/Thisambiguity reflects recent debate in the literature about what
constitutes a neutral tax incentive. Assuming that a tax cut is
intended to affect all assets similarly, it is not clear whether there
should be equal percentage reductions in the rental prices (gross of
depreciation) or in the required returns (net of depreciation). Since
Emil Sunley (1973, 1976b) has argued for each view in turn, the issue
has come to be known as the Sunley vs Sunley controversey. Bradford
(1980) concurs with Sunley (1976b) that maximization of net output
requites equalized social returns net of depreciation.
13/ Clarification and discussion of the necessary assumptions are provided
in Tiebout (1956), McGuire (1974), Hamilton (1976), Fisehel (1975),
and White (1975).
14/ The 48 percent corporate rate and 15.7 percent personal rate combine
to 56 percent, but FS assume that the increase in the interest rate
is partially passed on to depositors. Interest rate ceilings constrain
the depositors' increase to 0.3 percent for each one percent increase in
the inflation rate. The total marginal tax rate on banks and their
depositors is then 54 percent.
15/ In a comment on the Feldstein—Summers study, Gravelle (1980) concentrates
on "(1) the questionable assumption that no other tax policies would have
changed in the absence of inflation, (2) the use of NIPA depreciation, and
(3) the inappropriateness of attempting to measure the effect of tax policy
on investment behavior over time using the accounting measures of effective
taxratesderived from the NIPA" (p. 474), that is, the use of average
rather than marginal effective corporate tax rates. On the 54 percent
rate of banks, Gravelle calls into question the assumption that all addi-
tional nominal interest income would be profits for the bank. She uses
data indicating that 37.9 percent of bank income goes to operating costs,
49.3 percent goes to interest payments, and only 12.8 percent to profits.
For increases in the nominal interest rates paid to banks, she finds much
lower marginal tax rates. KF make similar points about the FS study, but
differ in that they look at additions to investment rather than additions
to interest rates.
16/ This expression uses the .46 federal corporate tax rate rather than
the .495 combined corporate taxrate,because state governments typically
impose premiumtaxes(on the consumer's purchase of life insurance services)
rather than income taxes (on the investment income of the life insurance
corporation). Feldstein and Summers use a 48 percent federal rate, and
they take the difference between the tax at i.07 and the tax at i .08,
rather than actually differentiating.
17/ The difference between the two margins is recognized by Feldstein, Poterba,
and Dicks—Mireaux (1983). They measure an average effective total tax
rate by including actual corporate taxes in the numerator, plus the taxes
on marginal interest (and dividend) receipts that would be associated with
additional savings from households, pensions, and life insurance companies.References
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